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1 
To Get the Prices Right for Food: The State versus 
the Market in Reforming China, 1979–2006 
 
This article examines the role of China’s gradual reforms in 
fostering food production by causally assessing China’s state 
policies of food market-rebuilding. To this aim we collect policy 
material on government food pricing, subsidies and procurement 
fund from central documents over the period of 1979-2006 and 
construct a dataset of policy implementation cost for estimation. 
Our causality test results indicate that fluctuations in food 
production were unidirectionally caused by food policy 
transformations determined by the “visible hand” of China’s 
reformist state aiming to guide the economy towards a simulated, 
price based market signal system. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
By the time when Mao died in 1976, a market economy had been absent in Mainland 
China for about three decades. Rather, the stiff administrative control over resources 
and resource allocation in the name of the Soviet centrally planned economy was the 
economy-wide norm. As a result, economic efficiency was low, and the economic 
structure and growth were severely distorted (e.g., Feuchtwang 1983; Lin 1990; 
Perkins 1988).1  
 
 
1 See e.g. Lin, “Collectivization and China’s agricultural crisis in 1959–1961”; Lardy, Agriculture in China’s 
modern economic development; Feuchtwang, The Chinese economic reforms; Perkins, “Reforming China’s 
economic system”; Li and Zheng, Deng Xiaoping Yu Gaige Kaifang Shisi Nian; Fan and Nolan, China’s 
 
 
2 
Deng Xiaoping’s reforms in the post-Mao Era (i.e. after 1976) began in the food 
sector, marked by a re-introduction of property rights and economic incentives 
among producers (McMillan et al. 1989). Despite the grassroots initiatives, under a 
party-state, China’s reforms have been clearly state-led and state-promoted (White 
1991). Moreover, changes were very gradual without the “shock therapy” of the 
Russian type (Fan and Nolan 1994). Contrasting a shock therapy of the Soviet type, 
gradual reforms helped China avoid a macroeconomic downfall that was regarded as 
an inevitable by-product of a sudden liberalisation of a centally planned economy 
(Roland 2000).  Different from the partial reforms of the state searching and 
making up frictions related to the prior absence of markets (Murphy Shleifer and 
Vishny 1992), Chinese state simulated a market-like environment for the food sector 
before its market liberalisation. Thus throughout the reform era, the visible hand of 
the interventionist state was busy in creating a food market for the economy, 
simultaneously handling both the demand and the supply sides.  
This was a mammoth task. Being the world most populous country, food security 
in China has long been a major test for the governing ability. It is also vital for the 
legitimacy of the ruling class. The Chinese state rarely resorted its staple food supply to 
international market unless on peculiar occasions such as the Great Leap Famine 
(1959-1961, see Table 1). Food security in China thus was equivalent to the 
self-sufficiency in staple food supply. But Mao’s three-decade-long exploitative and 
harsh “food dictatorship” (Ryan 2012) had led to a chronic farming recession to 
threaten China’s food security. On the eve of reform (1976-1978) China’s net food 
imports rebounded to a similar level as in the Great Leap Famine (see Table 1). Any 
 
 
economic reforms; Leng, Reform and development in Deng’s China; Larus, Economic reform in China, 
1979-2003.  
3 
reduction in food prices would cause an even deeper recession in the farming sector. 
In other words, the revitalisation of China’s food sector after Maoist mismanagement 
necessitated a manipulated higher food prices.  
 
Table 1. Food import-export balance under Maoism  
 South China North China China’s total 
Pre-collectivisation    
1953–1955 688.5 204.3 892.8 
Post-collectivisation    
1956–1960 1,950.5 –472.0 1,478.5 
1961–1965 669.5 –2,013.5 –1,344.0 
1966–1970 942.0 –796.5 145.5 
1971–1975 952.5 –1,159.0 –206.5 
1976–1978 –22.8 –1,106.4 –1,129.2 
Sources: Based on Contemporary Agricultural History Study Group, Rural Economy Institute, Ministry of 
Agriculture, eds., Dangdai Zhongguo Nongye Biange Yu Fazhan Yanjiu, p. 251.  
Notes: 10,000 tonnes; negative figures mean food imports to bridge domestic food deficits.  
 
Assuming all individual farmers were rational economic agents who made their 
production decisions according to their expected future revenue from their grain 
sales (Schultz 1964), it was the responsibility of the monopsonic state to set the 
“right price” for food. Meanwhile, urban labour market reforms turned out to be 
slow and apathetic, which forced the government to spend more on urban food 
subsidies rather than reducing them. So, in both circumstances the “right price” 
depended on the depth of the government pocket to pay,2 ceteris paribus. If so, the 
success of food-marketisation gradualism relied on the state’s fiscal affordability 
(Figure 5).  
 
 
2 Here, the Chinese state did not behave like a “developmental state” that purposely “gets the prices wrong” 
in order to change the growth trajectory of the economy; see Amsden, Asia’s next giant, p. 139. Rather, the 
main concern was how to “get the prices right” for China’s food security. 
4 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Gradualism of Chinese government to give way to the food market 
Source: Finance Yearbook of China. 
Notes: This figure plots the reducing proportion of total food subsidies paid by 
government in its annual fiscal expenditure. This figure presents the gradualism 
of the interventionist Chinese government to give way to the market for food 
security.  
 
 
Our study is inspired by economists who investigate the role of state in market 
reforms (Perkins 1988; White 1991; Roland 2000; Murphy et al. 1992) and who link 
Chinese agriculture to government food policies, and food security (Kueh 1984; Ash 
1988 and 1991; Lin 1989;phay Sicular 1995). The existing empirical studies on 
0.
05
0.
10
0.
15
0.
20
0.
25
0.
30
Fi
sc
al
 P
re
ss
ur
e 
(r
at
io
)
19
79
19
80
19
81
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
Fo
od
 S
ub
si
dy
-F
is
ca
l C
ap
ac
ity
 R
at
io
19
79
19
80
19
81
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
5 
China’s food sector usually assess food policies with various output data. Such an 
approach commonly refers to farming inputs such as new chemical fertilizers (Fan 
2000; Ma et al. 1989), new seed varieties (Lin 1991; Jin 2010), better irrigation and 
farming machinery (Yao and Liu 1998). These inputs are quantified in physical 
terms. Unlike physical inputs, institutions and their effects are not always 
quantifiable. Thus, input-output analysis is routinely conducted as a proxy for any 
institution-output inquiry on China’s food marketisation.3 The challenge is whether 
the input-output proxy is able to reveal the mechanisms with which a gradualist 
government rebuilds the market . So far, few studies have paid sufficient attention to 
how Chinese government used food dual pricing to manipulate rural food output and 
urban wage bill, and how reformist state used monopoly to transit food sector 
towards a functional market. This work fills in this gap in scholarship.  
Our source of information comes mainly from decrees and regulations of the 
central government in Beijing, in which we found the government’s major motives in 
decision-making were monopsonic availability and the resultant fiscal affordability. 
Due to data availability,4 our observations are made for the period from 1979 to 
2006 when China moved step by step towards marketisation of food, including 
procurement pricing (1979), bilateral contractual procurement (1984), abolition of 
urban grain rationing (1993), new regulations on procurement fund (1995–96), grain 
bureau deregulation (1998), and grain market liberalization (2004). We also notice 
 
 
3 Huang and Rozelle, “Technological change: rediscovering the engine of productivity growth in 
China’s rural economy”; Lin, “An economic theory”; idem “Rural reforms and agricultural growth”; 
Fan, “Effects of technological change and institutional reform on production growth in Chinese 
agriculture”. 
4 For example, urban subsidy on grain, cotton and edible oil data stops at the year of 2006.  
6 
that specific policies appeared in cluster (e.g. urban subsidies during 1990–93, grain 
procurement during 1995–97, and the grain bureau reforms during 1998–2003).  
Methodologically, we set up a conceptual framework of government’s 
choice-making among different pricing policies under a fiscal constraint. We also 
check whether the model we build qualitatively matches the historical reality. We 
then build a time series dataset of annual changes in grain output, food procurement 
price and the central government expenditure for 1979 to 2006. We use the Granger 
causality method to see if the relationship between food output and government 
expenditure was causal. Moreover, we adopt an unrestricted vector autoregression 
(VAR) approach to detect the link between food policies and food output. Our results 
show that food output in China was causally determined by government capacity to 
pay for food. Government policies enhanced farmers’ physical inputs in food 
production, as government monopsonic price was positively reflected in grain 
production in a lagged term. This was the endeavour to get the food price right. 
Gradualist reforms in China’s food security reform worked well.  
The rest of this article is organised as follows: Section 2 introduces historical 
background of China’s food sector reform. Section 3 simulates the central 
policy-making procedure. Section 4 discusses rationales of government policies and 
their changes. Section 5 is devoted to empirical strategy and results, and section 6 
contains the final conclusions.  
 
2. Historical Background 
Under Maoism, food supply in the urban sector was heavily protected by the state. 
The Maoist state acted as the sole food dealer between the rural and urban sectors: as 
a food monopsonist in the rural and a monopolist in the urban, it completely 
7 
controlled food circulation from the farming to the industry sectors. Rural food was 
strictly procured at artificially low prices to sustain low wage cost for 
industrialisation. A direct consequence was the stifling of all state procurement 
prices for rural products which in turn stagnated the incentives, growth and 
development of the farming sector (Deng 2011); not to mention the unprecedented 
famine in peace time and with good weather during the late 1950s and early 60s 
(Dikötter 2010). 5 Prices, in a closed food circulation, were used for accounting 
purposes only, as the consumer had no power to decide how much to eat and what to 
eat, while the producer was not allowed to decide when and where to grow what 
food, for whom, and by how much.  
Deng Xiaoping’s reforms endorsed the incentives of producers in the farming 
sector. This was achieved by the implementation of the “household contractual 
production responsibility system” (jiating shengchan chengbao zeren zhi) in the 
early 1980s, which empowered the producers for the first time since the communist 
takeover in 1949. Overnight, the peasantry became price sensitive again like their 
ancestors, ready for marketisation of rural produce.  
There was, however, an institutional asymmetry. The consumers in urban China, 
accounting for about 20 per cent of the country’s population, were not yet ready for 
the market for food. Despite the government commitment to “forced industrialisation” 
which seemingly favoured the urban working class,6 Maoism systematically halved 
China’s urban real wages.7 So, the “living wage” under Mao existed but in name. In 
this context, even with strict urban food ration, government had to pay for the urban 
 
 
5 Dikötter, Mao’s great famine.  
6 For the term, see Spulber, Organizational alternatives in soviet-type economies. 
7 Deng, Mapping China’s growth and development in the long run, pp. 168–9.  
8 
food bill, or soaring food prices would deter the industrialisation. Fundamentally, 
this combination of food-ration and food subsidies was determined by the absence of 
a labour market that set urban living wages at a market rate. As the re-establishment 
of an urban labour market appeared much later, food-rationing and food subsidies in 
the urban sector – the signature pattern of resource allocation under the Soviet 
central planning for food – had to continue. Low food selling prices were politically 
safe and politically correct for the post-Mao state.  
Consequently, although rural producers were ready to react to the price signal 
from the food market, urban consumers still responded to non-market signals of 
rations and subsidies. This rural-urban dichotomy and mismatch resulted in the 
continuing “dual prices” for the same food (shuangchong jiage), as a result of 
different paces of reforms in the two key sectors of the economy. But this time, price 
difference could no longer be paid by farmers; otherwise famine would sweep across 
Chinese cities. 
It was now up to the post-Mao reformist state to somehow bridge the two sides of 
supply versus demand which represented two fundamentally different economies: an 
increasingly marketised economy and a moribund planned economy. It was a tall 
order. As far as one can tell, the government fiscal burden was on the rise during the 
period in question. Sometimes it even outpaced overall fiscal capability (see Figure 
2)..  
 
9 
 
Figure 2. Urban food price subsidies and government expenditure 
Source: Finance Yearbook of China.  
Notes: This figure plots the changes in price subsidies for urban grain 
consumption and the total central government expenditure. Both indicators are 
used in nominal term to reflect the policy-makers’ observations on the same 
year’s fascial conditions and their food subsidy decision made under the 
real-time fiscal affordability.  
 
In the very beginning, the reformist state acted as a price-giver for both the 
demand and supply sides. For the rural price-taking producers and urban 
price-taking consumers, the state represented the “proxy market demand” for food 
and the “proxy market supply” to distribute the same food. Both rural producers and 
urban consumers relied on the state prices to make choices and decisions. In such a 
system, it was not just a zero-sum game between the rural and urban sectors. If the 
procurement prices were set too low, the production shrank. So, China’s annual 
aggregate food output, and hence food availability and food security for China, was 
at the mercy of the state monopsonic prices for rural output.  
Technically speaking, the state was an arbitrager between the two sides but it was 
by no means a rent-seeker. Rather, as we will show, the state lost money in its 
arbitraging.  
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10 
The current study reveals that it is an illusion that with all the resources it 
controlled, China’s almighty party-state was fully capable of assuring the country’s 
food security with ease. This was not the case. For the years 1983–95, China’s grain 
output grew merely in pace with its population. Although food supply increased 
ahead of the population during 1996–99, it fell behind population growth in the 
period 2000–6 (see figure 1-A). China’s food availability fluctuated violently, 
meaning that the country’s food self-sufficiency was sometimes in jeopardy (see 
figure 1-B).  
 
 
Figure 1. Fluctuations in food output and per capita food stock, 1979–2006 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook. 
Notes: Panel A of figure 1 plots the changes in total grain output in pace with China’s 
population growth. Panel B plots the per capita grain possession for each individual 
Chinese.  
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3. Conceptual Framework for Policy Choices 
3.1. Basic setup  
The reformist state acted as the “substitute for the missing market” (à la Alexander 
Gerschenkron) in the economy. Its role was three-fold: (i) to create the price signal 
for the newly emerged market economy in the food sector, (ii) to fade out gradually 
the failed planned economy in the urban sector in conjunction with the 
re-establishment of an urban labour market with a real living wage at a market rate, 
and (iii) to obtain food security for the country as a whole. The state thus used three 
policy instruments to manipulate the market: (i) procurement monopsonic pricing (ii) 
urban food subsidy under food monopoly, and (iii) a macro control over procurement 
fund. However,  these three major tasks were not always compatible with one 
another, which was the root cause of the China’s food policy swings during the 
period in question.  
To understand the policy-maker’s choices, firstly, we assume that farmers always 
respond to the price signal regardless of whether it is a market price or government 
monopsonic price, and hence:  
 
  𝑌𝑌 = 𝑌𝑌(𝑃𝑃),            (4) 
 
Where 𝑌𝑌 is positively related to the price level, i.e. 𝑌𝑌′(𝑃𝑃) > 0.  
Secondly, the leading price is the state monopsonic price  𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠, consisting of the 
market equilibrium price  𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒  and  the overpriced portion 𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔  caused by the 
government output-promotion monopsonic price during the period when food 
shortage looms large. Thus we have :  
 
12 
  𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠 = 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒 + 𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔.        (5) 
 
 Both 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒 and 𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠 satisfy 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒 > 0, 𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠 > 0. When the government procurement price is 
not the same as the equilibrium level, 𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠 ≠ 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒 , 𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔 ≠ 0, the market clearance level 
under the government influence becomes 𝑌𝑌𝑠𝑠 = 𝑌𝑌(𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒 + 𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔), where 𝑌𝑌𝑠𝑠 differs from 
the market equilibrium level 𝑌𝑌𝑒𝑒, which is free from government influence.  
Figure 6 presents the situation when the grain economy is under strict state 
monopsony. In order to keep the market at clearance levels, the government has to 
pay for the difference between the urban subsidised price 𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑 and the monopsonic 
price 𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠. The distortion of the market can be measured by the grain output 𝑌𝑌𝑠𝑠 at a 
market clearance price 𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑. The total grain subsidies equal to 𝑠𝑠𝑌𝑌𝑠𝑠 (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠), in which 
the rate of subsidies 𝑠𝑠 is the difference between the procurement price and the 
market clearance price, i.e. 𝑠𝑠 = 𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠 − 𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Grain production under state monopsony  
Notes: This figure presents the situation when food market is under state 
monopsonic control. The slashed part indicates the total food subsidies that 
government has to pay to fulfil national food security under its monopsony. This 
𝑌𝑌 
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figure demonstrates China’s food market simulation and manipulation after 
1979.  
 
From the viewpoint of the central government operation, the total expenditure on 
grain  𝐺𝐺 is confined within the limit of 𝐺𝐺 ≤ ?̅?𝐺. More specifically, 𝐺𝐺 is determined 
by (i) the grain procurement cost  𝑅𝑅 =  𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑌𝑌, where 𝑟𝑟 denotes the interest rate in 
grain purchasing; (ii) the urban price subsidies  𝑠𝑠𝑌𝑌𝑠𝑠 , and (iii) the monopsony 
management cost 𝑀𝑀(𝑌𝑌) = 𝑚𝑚𝑌𝑌 . The government expenditure on grain can be 
presented as:  
 
𝐺𝐺 = 𝑅𝑅 + 𝑠𝑠𝑌𝑌 + 𝑀𝑀.         (6) 
 
By the same token, to simulate central policy-making on food security, we assume 
that policy-makers have to solve a utility function with budget constraint:  
 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑈𝑈 = {𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐺𝐺,𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑌𝑌}, subjected to 𝐺𝐺 ≤ ?̅?𝐺.     (7) 
 
3.2. Market simulation and manipulation 
With the premise that food output is determined by farmer’s reaction to price signals 
created by the reformist state, food production and government fiscal capacity shall 
be on co-movement in the given manipulated market environment. This 
co-movement can be causal, if government market simulation and manipulation 
works well; or non-causal if simulation and manipulation fails. Thus the causal 
relations between government fiscal capacity and food production can be shown in 
two scenarios.  
14 
Scenario 1: fiscal expenditure does not cause food output if 𝐺𝐺 is not capped. 
When ?̅?𝐺 is removed from decision-making, 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑌𝑌 is no longer constrained. Then, 
policy-makers’ target is simplified to solve a utility function with a minimal 
expenditure on grain:  
 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑈𝑈 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝐺𝐺 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 {𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑌𝑌 + 𝑠𝑠𝑌𝑌 + 𝑚𝑚𝑌𝑌}.       (8) 
 
Here, when the government fiscal capacity can afford all grain monopsony costs and 
at the same time delivers the desirable total output 𝑌𝑌 at any level, the government 
policy is simplified to the point of an increase in efficiency of the grain procurement 
fund and government food monopoly by reducing 𝑟𝑟 and 𝑚𝑚, because, in reality, both 
𝑟𝑟 and 𝑚𝑚 are irrelevant to grain output, only dependent on the governance quality of 
the food regulator.  
Moreover, when the total output is given exogenous   𝑌𝑌 = 𝑌𝑌𝑠𝑠 , the difference 
between the food procurement price and the market clearance price 𝑠𝑠  is also 
exogenous, as 𝑠𝑠 = 𝑃𝑃(𝑌𝑌𝑠𝑠) − 𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑. The central government has no impact on 𝑌𝑌; and there 
is no causality from the central fiscal expenditure to food production when 𝐺𝐺 is not 
capped:  
 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑈𝑈 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝐺𝐺(𝑟𝑟,𝑚𝑚).       (9) 
 
Scenario 2: fiscal expenditure causes food output if it has an upper limit 𝐺𝐺 ≤ ?̅?𝐺. If 
the grain procurement fund 𝑅𝑅 =  𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑌𝑌  and administrative cost of monopsony 
𝑀𝑀(𝑌𝑌) = 𝑚𝑚𝑌𝑌 both satisfy 𝑅𝑅′′ > 0 and  𝑀𝑀′′ > 0, then 𝐺𝐺′′(𝑌𝑌) > 0. Further, we assume 
central government’s fiscal preference is linear or quasi-linear on increasing 
15 
marginal cost, which means that the marginal grain output does not cause extra 
utility to the central government. Then we have:  
 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑈𝑈 = {𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐺𝐺(𝑌𝑌),𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑌𝑌}, where  𝐺𝐺′′(𝑌𝑌) > 0 and 𝐺𝐺 ≤ ?̅?𝐺.    (10) 
 
This means any increase in output potential, such as technical progress and demand 
changes, will increase government expenditure. If the central government grain 
expenditure is bound to a fiscal capacity which is incapable of financing grain 
monopsony, to maintain its overall utility the central government either depresses 
output 𝑌𝑌, or reduces subsidy 𝑠𝑠 and abandons 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 𝑌𝑌: 
 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑈𝑈 = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝐺𝐺(𝑠𝑠,𝑃𝑃), where 𝐺𝐺′′(𝑌𝑌) > 0 and 𝐺𝐺 ≤ ?̅?𝐺.      (11) 
 
Thus if there exists a long-run unidirectional causal relationship from the central 
fiscal expenditure to the grain production, it is reasonable to believe that China’s 
food policy-making resembles Scenario 2. Government food market simulation and 
manipulation works well:  
Proposition 1: this causal relations also corroborates upper bounds ?̅?𝐺 in the 
central government’s fiscal load on grain monopsony to limit policy-maker’s 
decision making, 𝐺𝐺 ≤ ?̅?𝐺.  
Proposition 2: also, with the monopsony of grain, all government food policies 
eventually take effect through affecting the final grain output and supply 𝑌𝑌𝑠𝑠 (hence 
through affecting China’s food security)..  
 
3.3. Policy effect  
16 
This framework captures the transmission mechanisms between government market 
simulation and manipulation and food output. Amongst all three major reasons for 
fiscal crises, food market reforms are linked to procurement prices  𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠 , urban 
subsidised selling prices 𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑 , grain procurement fund 𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑌𝑌  and food system 
management cost 𝑚𝑚(𝑌𝑌). Essentially, the former two are about food subsidy system, 
and the latter two refer to the state’s food monopoly. Without affecting the overall 
approach of a state-led market transition, food subsidy system is reasonably the first 
to be reformed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Ending of food subsidies  
Notes: This figure presents the situation when urban food rationing and subsidy 
were stripped off from central finance. When subsidies narrowed to the slashed 
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area, food production decreased correspondingly. This figure demonstrates the 
second round of food policy transformation. 
 
Figure 7 demonstrates the mechanisms of subsidy system changes. The 
policy-makers can increase urban food price from 𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑 to 𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑′ ; or they can reduce the 
rural procurement price 𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠 to 𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠′ t reduce subsidy. Both choices reduce the grain 
market clearance level. However, the result of capping grain subsidies capped grain 
output as well: when subsidies were narrowed from 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠 to 𝐴𝐴′𝐴𝐴′𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑′𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠′, grain output 
declined from 𝑌𝑌𝑠𝑠 to 𝑌𝑌𝑠𝑠′. But the urban selling price increased to 𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑′  with contractions in 
consumer’s surplus and producer’s surplus 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴′𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑′𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑 and 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴′𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠′𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠, respectively. Once 
the urban sector is ready for a full market price for food without hardships thanks to 
the fast rising urban wage rate (e.g., the early 1990s), the food subsidy system shall 
be swiftly ended as a result.  
With the abolition of the urban subsidy, the fiscal pressure will be greatly eased 
that the government had the resources to increase grain procurement funds and 
invest in grain monopoly. But when grain output again reached a certain high level, 
pressure on the government budget returns. At this point, the government 
expenditure function changes to  𝐺𝐺 = 𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑌𝑌 + 𝑚𝑚𝑌𝑌 , retaining only the grain 
procurement fund and cost of monopoly.  
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Figure 8. Grain monopoly reforms 
Notes: This figure presents the process of welfare loss to both food producer and 
consumer due to the grain bureaus’ monopsony over grain. The slashed area 
indicates grain bureaus’ gains from arbitrage in food circulation. This Figure 
also demonstrates the third round of food policy transformation when the state 
gradually relinquished its food monopoly rights to the grain bureaus.  
 
Figure 8 demonstrates a welfare loss to both the urban consumers and the rural 
producer due to grain bureaus’ arbitrage. With arbitrage, urban grain price leaps to 
𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑
′′ plus a depressed grain procurement price 𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠′′ . Grain bureaus make profit 
𝐴𝐴′′𝐴𝐴′′𝑃𝑃𝑑𝑑
′′𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠
′′ , which comes from the consumer’s surplus and producer’s surplus. 
Meanwhile, the grain output drops to 𝑌𝑌𝑠𝑠′′ . A part of social welfare 𝐴𝐴′𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴′𝐶𝐶𝐷𝐷 
becomes the deadweight loss. This process presents a trail of relinquishing 
monopoly rights granted to state-owned food dealers, in order to guide food sector 
forward towards a market. Afterwards the government terminated state grain 
monopsony and arbitrage. Food price and production move back to an equilibrium 
level 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒 and 𝑌𝑌𝑒𝑒 the government-free market finally returns to the food sector.  
This framework also explains why government policy reforms were not random 
but dictated by costs incurred by some specific choices. 
 
4. Changes in Food Policies  
The food market simulation and manipulation modelled in Section III is further 
supported by output data and food policies shown in Table 4 where the policy and 
production co-move with each other: (i) the 1979–88 procurement price adjustment, 
𝑌𝑌 
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(ii) the 1989–93 food subsidy system reform, (iii) the 1994–2003 monopoly rights 
for procurement fund and grain enterprises, and (iv) the 2004–06 market 
liberalisation. 8  Changes in food policies conform to our propositions in  the 
modelling. 
 
Table 4. Co-movement between food policies and food output, 1979–2006 
Year 
Policy 
Transformations Key changes 
Production turning 
points (m. tonnes) 
Change 
rate (%) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
1979–1984 Price control Increasing procurement prices 
(1979); facing budget deficits (1982) 
↗407(max, 1984) 5.062 
1985–1988  Reversing 30:70 ratio (1985) ⇝379 (min, 1985) –0.733 
1989–1990 Food subsidies  Reforming state procurement 
(1990);  
↗446 (max, 1990) 6.456 
1991–1993  increasing the grain rationing price 
(1991); purchasing and selling at the 
same price (1992); abolishing urban 
grain coupon system (1993) 
⇝435 (min, 1991) 0.787 
1994–1998 Government 
monopoly 
(procurement fund 
and grain bureaus) 
Withholding accounts and 
suspending interests (1994); 
reforming grain purchase fund and 
grain bureaus (1998) 
↗512 (max, 1998) 2.416 
1999–2003  Liberalising the grain trade (2003-4) ↘430 (min, 2003) –3.342 
2004–2006 Marketisation Abolishing the agricultural tax 
(2004–5) 
↗498 (max, 2006) 5.000 
 
Notes: This table provides a summary of changes in China’s food polices and farming performance. 
Column (2) and (3) presents key food policies collected from China’s government documents. The 
data in column (4) refer to the total grain output in the year of production turning points. Column (5) 
refers to a stepwise change of average growth rate of grain production. This table shows that each 
grain production cycle (column 4) coincided with a round of food policy transformation (column 3) 
 
 
9 This means that 30 per cent of the government procurement price was subject to a lowered 
baseline and 70 per cent of government procurement price fetched a bonus price of 50 per cent 
higher than the baseline price. Overall, the government procurement price increased 135 per cent 
from the 1984 level. The calculation is as follows:   
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in China.  
 
 
4.1. Procurement pricing policy 
The first round of reforms took place in 1979 to 1988 to boost grain output with an 
increase in government “procurement quota pricing” (tonggou jia) and “above-quota 
bonus pricing” (chaogou jia) in order to nurture the market for the rural sector for 
the first time after China’s chronic food shortage under Mao’s collectivisation. In 
accordance with the 1979 Decisions of the Fourth Plenary Session of the Eleventh 
Chinese Communist Party Central Committee (CCPCC), the government 
procurement price for grain increased 50–80 per cent. The peasantry responded. 
From 1979 to 1984, China enjoyed successive bumper harvests, with an annual 
growth rate of 5.1 per cent. The rice output increased 30.2 per cent from the 1978 
level, and wheat, 63.1 per cent.  
Such a rise in total food output in conjunction with higher procurement prices led 
to government’s fiscal difficulty. It is stated in Document No. 137 issued in 1982 by 
the CCPCC that the sharp increase in the grain sales has exceeded the state’s fiscal 
capacity. This can only be understood in conjunction with China’s urban food 
subsidies which prevented the government from recouping its grain procurement 
costs. At that time, to deregulate urban food pricing seems to have been politically 
dangerous. The government’s only option was to reduce its procurement price for the 
peasantry. The new pricing policy was called the “reversed 30:70 ratio” (dao san qi) 
announced in 1985.9 The rice procurement price was cut by 6.9 per cent in 1986. 
 
 
9 This means that 30 per cent of the government procurement price was subject to a lowered 
baseline and 70 per cent of government procurement price fetched a bonus price of 50 per cent 
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This unilateral change reversed the growth momentum in grain production: wheat 
output fell 10.3 per cent, and China’s aggregate grain output declined 0.7 per cent in 
response to the new pricing. Clearly, the Chinese peasantry became market-price 
literate. Nevertheless, this drop threatened China’s national food security.  
To rescue food security, the government introduced stimuli. 10 China’s grain 
production again responded. In 1990, the total outputs of rice and wheat reached 
their highest level since 1949. China’s total rice output in 1990 was 189.33 million 
tonnes, 11.1 million tonnes higher than the previous peak in 1984 and about 40 per 
cent higher than in 1978 when reforms began. China’s wheat output reached 98.2 
million tonnes in 1990, an increase of over 80 per cent from the level of 1978. The 
government had to buy in more food thanks to its food monopsony despite its 
unchanged urban monopolistic sale price of grain, which meant an increasing budget 
burden for the state.11 As figure 2 shows, the urban food subsidies amounted for 
22.4 billion yuan, or a quarter of the central government average revenue of the time.  
 
4.2. Urban subsidy policy 
 
 
higher than the baseline price. Overall, the government procurement price increased 135 per cent 
from the 1984 level. The calculation is as follows:   
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃1985 = 30% ∙ 𝑄𝑄𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃1984 + 70% ∙ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑄𝑄𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃1984  
             = 30% ∙ 𝑄𝑄𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃1984 + 70% ∙ (150% ∙ 𝑄𝑄𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃1984)  
             = 135% ∙ 𝑄𝑄𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃1984  
In CCPCC 1 (1985), the state also imposed a “protected price” (baohu jia) equal to the preceding 
year’s quota price. Such a price was lower than the baseline price. The policy had a negative 
influence on farmers’ production incentives.  
10 The policy linked production to the provision of subsidized chemical fertilizers (pingjia huafei) 
and diesel oil for farming machines.  
11 This is known as the “inversed urban-rural prices for grain” (chengxiang liangshi gouxiao jiage 
daogua), in which the rural procurement price was higher than the urban sale price.  
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This ushered in the second round of reforms in 1989 to 1993 (table 4 and figure 4). 
In 1991, the central government reduced urban food subsidies as a way to introduce 
the market to the urban consumers. A mere year later, a new “one price” policy, or 
“purchasing and selling grain at the same price” (gouxiao tongjia), was attempted to 
eradicate urban food subsidies completely. A new law was passed in 1993 to address 
this issue.12 The share of the urban food subsidies in central government budget 
spending soon plummeted from 23.5 per cent in 1993 to 7.0 per cent in 1994.  
Soon after the grain deregulation, the urban grain price rose sharply, 13 
jeopardising social stability in urban China. It forced the central government to 
resume monopsony over grain, leading to the third round of policy changes. 
Predictably, the grain monopsony returned, as too did the pressure on government 
finance. Then, in 1995 the State Council tightened the grain procurement budget.14 
The central government also commissioned the Agricultural Development Bank of 
China to manage its grain procurement budget. 15 But cumulative grain deficits  
kept increasing over the five consecutive years from 1994 to 1998 (figure 4).16 
 
 
12 See Chapter 4 “Agriculture Product Circulation” in the 1993 Agriculture Law. 
13 Compared with the previous year, the 1993 and 1994 CPI increased by 14.7 per cent and 24.1 per cent, 
respectively. 
14 In 1995, the State Council divided government grain bureaus’ duties into two parts – “commercial 
transactions” (jingying xing yewu) and “policy-based transactions” (zhengce xing yewu), and made clear that 
commercial transactions should not use grain procurement budgets.  
15 According to the grain budget management rules established by Ministry of Finance 139 (1996), all 
“special funds for purchasing grain” (gouliang zhuankuan) must be jointly managed by the Agricultural 
Development Bank of China and the State Ministry of Finance. 
16 According to Liu et al (2004), the grain-cum-deficits in the grain bureaus had rapidly increased to 120 
billion yuan by 1998, or 100 million yuan per day; see Liu, Zhang and Huo, Zhongguo Sannong Wenti 
Baogao. 
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According to State Council Document No. 15 (1998), the cost of grain overwhelmed 
the government finance.17  
 
4.3. Procurement fund and grain bureau policy 
Against this backdrop, a new round of reforms was kick started.18 From 1998, as 
part of the marketisation reforms the state-owned grain bureaus were made 
financially independent.19 Meanwhile, the State Council’s Decree No. 244 (1998) 
imposed a new principle of “selling grain at a favourable price” (shunjia xiaoshou) 
to recoup the monopsonic procurement cost. This could only mean a price drop in 
government procurement prices for farmers. It ushered in China’s largest trough in 
food output from 1999 until 2003, which forced the central policy-maker to abandon 
grain monopsony after 2004.  
In a nutshell, in the process of re-establishing the market for agriculture, a high 
government procurement price warranted more food output and hence better food 
security; and a low food price helped the urban consumers with their living standards. 
The reformist state had to strike a balance between the two sectors and gradually 
introduced the market to both sectors. The state gradually and successfully exited 
from the food market.  
In reality, gradualism had its limits. Every time food procurement pressure on the 
 
 
17 The major focus of the State Council of People’s Republic of China Document No. 15 (1998) (hereafter 
SCPRC 15 (1998)) was on how to control grain bureaus’ deficits. For the first time the state asked all grain 
bureaus to conduct independent accounting. The central finance was no longer willing to pay the deficits. 
SCPRC 15 (1998).  
18 First, in 1997 the state announced a new guideline for grain bureaus as “cost plus slim profit” (baoben 
weili). This principle signalled that the government selling price should bring back a profit. 
19 SCPRC 15 (1998) separated grain procurement and storage enterprises from grain bureaus to better 
control deficits. SCPRC 15 (1998).  
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government budget became too high, China’s policy-makers opted for deregulation 
to avoid a fiscal crisis. In doing so, the government either narrows the subsidy gap 
(procured less grain and offered a lower price) or relinquishes food monopoly and 
opens the market. Changes in procurement were communicated to the farmers, which 
in turn reduced China’s food output and national food security in the following year. 
The alarm was then raised by the watchdog the National Statistical Bureau and the 
government had to reverse its price policy. This is demonstrated by a government 
food policies chronicle from 1979 to 2006.  
 
5. Empirical Strategy and Results  
5.1. Data description 
Following the policy classification and changes in food production (see Table 4 in 
Section 4), we restrict our observations to 10 time series, five for grain production 
(𝑌𝑌𝑃𝑃, 𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃, 𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡, 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡, 𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡),
20 four for fiscal conditions of the central government, and one 
for inflation. The time period chosen covers the years 1979 to 2006. The starting 
year marks the beginning of Deng Xiaoping’s reforms. After 2006, China had 
undergone fully-fledged marketisation in the food sector.  
Most data for this research come from China’s Statistical Yearbooks and Finance 
Yearbooks of China. National statistics in post-Mao China are often regarded as 
biased, but they are biased consistently, nevertheless. Also, as the only official data 
for China, national statistics serve as a reasonable source of information regarding 
 
 
20 Five time series selected to analyse grain production in China includes: 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 grain output; 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 number of 
employed persons in agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, and fishery; 𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡 irrigated land area; 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 
volume of effective component of chemical fertiliser used in agricultural production; 𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 total power 
of agricultural tractors.  
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the challenges and concerns we want to examine faced by China’s decision-makers. 
The data extracted from these yearbooks include (i) a set of change rates of grain 
inputs (𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃, 𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡, 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡, 𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡) and output (𝑌𝑌𝑃𝑃), as proxies of farmer’s effort paid and China’s 
food security, (ii) change rates of procurement fund as a percentage of central 
government expenditure (𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡), and (iii)  item details (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡, 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡, 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡) in central 
government expenditure on food market simulation and manipulation.21 All are in 
real terms (deflated by CPI). Table 2 reports basic descriptive statistics for the main 
variables used in this research.  
 
Table 2. Summary statistics 
 Obs. Mean SD Min. Max. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Panel (a): macro data 
Procurement fund-central government 
expenditure ratio (𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡) 
28 –1.206 18.286 –35.765 42.816 
Grain output (𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡)  28 1.896 5.146 –9.090 9.494 
Panel (b): inputs and institutions 
Physical inputs      
Labour (𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡) 28 0.136 1.960 –4.210 3.130 
Land (𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡) 28 0.778 1.285 –0.940 5.530 
Fertiliser (𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡) 28 6.438 5.019 0.540 22.880 
Machinery (𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡) 28 7.273 4.163 0.250 20.890 
Food policies      
Procurement price (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡) 28 1.571 11.052 –14.200 31.190 
Urban subsidy (𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡) 28 20.170 75.173 –27.583 383.189 
Government procurement fund (𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡) 28 2.895 14.041 –14.960 46.240 
 
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for key variables used in the empirical study. Panel (a) refers to 
macro data on government fiscal condition and food output in China and is used in the tests reported in table 
3. Panel (b) refers to detailed physical inputs and food policies used in the regression reported in table 5 and 
figure 3.  
 
 
21 To avoid possibility of a false conclusion flowing from imperfect data, we use year-on-year change rates 
of original data to obtain less biased trend.  
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5.2. Causality between government expenditure and food production 
Our premise is that in a transition from a centrally planned economy to a market one, 
China’s reformist state needed a sizable budget to create quasi-market incentives for 
the peasantry to produce more as well as to warrant the urban population its basic 
needs. In this context, the government food procurement prices determined China’s 
grain production for the subsequent year and hence China’s food security. 
Meanwhile, the food price offered by government grain procurement was subject to 
the government fiscal capacity. A pairwise Granger-causality test indeed shows the 
interrelation between the central government fiscal burden of food security and the 
grain output, following the basic equations below:  
 
�
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⎧� 𝛼𝛼1𝑚𝑚𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡−𝑚𝑚
𝑞𝑞
𝑚𝑚=1
+ � 𝛽𝛽1𝑚𝑚𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−𝑚𝑚𝑞𝑞
𝑚𝑚=1
+ 𝜀𝜀1𝑡𝑡
� 𝛼𝛼2𝑚𝑚𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−𝑚𝑚
𝑞𝑞
𝑚𝑚=1
+ � 𝛽𝛽2𝑚𝑚𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡−𝑚𝑚𝑞𝑞
𝑚𝑚=1
+ 𝜀𝜀2𝑡𝑡    .                      (1) 
 
Table 3 presents our results.  
 
Table 3. Causality between central government fiscal expenditure and 
grain output, 1979–2006 
    (1)    (2)  (3) 
Panel (a): Unit root test    
Variables      Level (t-statistics)       𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 –5.419    ***  –5.395  *** –5.017  *** 
 (0.193) (0.200) (0.187)      𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡  –3.470  *** –3.704  ** –3.513   *** 
 (0.186) (0.196) (0.183) 
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Panel (b): Granger-causality test   
Null hypothesis Observations F-statistics     𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡  does not cause  𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 25 5.119 ***     𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡  does not cause 𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡  1.778 
 
* = Significant at the 10 percent level. 
** = Significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** = Significant at the 1 percent level. 
Notes: The method of unit root test used in panel (a) is the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test with all 
three model specifications column (1) with constant only, column (2) with constant and time trend, and 
column (3) with no constant or trend are included. The lag order is chosen based on the Schwarz Criterion 
(SC). Panel (b) reports the pairwise Granger-causality test results. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses.  
 
Our results of unit root test imply that year on year change rates are stationary 
(Table 3, Panel (a)); hence the Granger causality test for statistical significance of 
lagged level terms can be used. For our purpose, three lag length is chosen. The 
causality test results are reported in panel (b) of table 3 where the computed 
F-statistics show that sequential unidirectional causality is significant. The p-value 
shows whether the null hypothesis can be rejected. The result from 𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡 to 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 is 
significant. So, the Granger causality is unidirectional from the central fiscal burden 
to farmers’ grain production for the next production cycle.  
 
 
5.3. Policy transformations and farming performance  
To test this interaction in food policies, we employ the unrestricted VAR model. 
Upon the policy changes shown in table 4, three new variables are added for 
regressions: (i) government rice procurement price index, (ii) urban subsidy index 
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for cotton and edible oil and grain, and (iii) government procurement fund index, all 
in real terms.22 To do so, we establish the following equations of food production 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 
as a dependent variable for regression:  
 
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 = 𝑃𝑃 +
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧ � 𝛼𝛼1𝑚𝑚𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−𝑚𝑚
𝑞𝑞
𝑚𝑚=1
+ � 𝛽𝛽1𝑚𝑚𝑿𝑿𝑡𝑡−𝑚𝑚𝑰𝑰𝑞𝑞
𝑚𝑚=1
+ 𝜀𝜀1𝑡𝑡
� 𝛼𝛼2𝑚𝑚𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−𝑚𝑚
𝑞𝑞
𝑚𝑚=1
+ � 𝛽𝛽2𝑚𝑚𝑿𝑿𝑡𝑡−𝑚𝑚𝑰𝑰𝑞𝑞
𝑚𝑚=1
+ � 𝛾𝛾2𝑚𝑚𝑿𝑿𝑡𝑡−𝑚𝑚𝑷𝑷𝑞𝑞
𝑚𝑚=1
+ 𝜀𝜀2𝑡𝑡                 (2) 
 
 
Where 𝑿𝑿𝑡𝑡𝑰𝑰 , 𝑿𝑿𝑡𝑡𝑷𝑷 stand for inputs (𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 , 𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡 , 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 , 𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡) and policy variables (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 , 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 , 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡) 
respectively; 𝛼𝛼𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚 denotes the coefficients of lagged term of dependent variables; 𝛽𝛽𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚 
for the independent physical input variables and 𝛾𝛾𝑘𝑘𝑚𝑚 for independent policy variables. 
The VAR testing aims to see if government monopsony-related policies individually 
or jointly caused grain production to change in order to establish a link between 
farmers’ producing behaviour seen from a change in physical inputs following the 
government policy swing.  
In addition, we use the impulse-response analysis to identify the responsiveness of food 
production 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 when a shock is introduced in the error term. This is noted as follows:  
 Yt = c + αiYt−i + θiXt−i + εt                                               (3) 
 
Where 𝑿𝑿𝑡𝑡 denotes both physical inputs and policy variables. Year-on-year change rates 
are used as estimators in the unrestricted VAR for variables. All of them are stationary at 
 
 
22 Unfortunately, the data for the grain bureau deficits are available only from 1998 to 2006. We omit the 
data and instead use grain procurement fund for the test.  
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levels 𝐼𝐼(0) in unit root test (table 5).23  
 
Table 5. Unit root test  
𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡   𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡  𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡  𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡  𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡  𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡  𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡  
Model –5.394 *** –4.643 *** –3.741 ** –4.871 *** –3.571 * –4.906 *** –13.817 *** –5.257 *** 
(i) (0.200) (0.273) (0.197) (0.156) (0.130) (0.180) (0.058) (0.186) 
Model –5.015 *** –2.373 ** –2.827 *** –2.788 *** –2.602 ** –5.180 *** –15.776 *** –5.460 *** 
(ii) (0.187) (0.147) (0.171) (0.097) (0.063) (0.171) (0.051) (0.174) 
 
* = Significant at the 10 percent level.  
** = Significant at the 5 percent level.  
*** = Significant at the 1 percent level.  
Notes: We test two ADF models with (i) with constant and trend, and (ii) with no constant or trend in 
the model specification. The lag order is chosen based on the SC. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses.  
 
After minimising testing statistics,24 two-lag length is used on each variable to 
secure the whiteness of residuals. To do so, we run the regression without policy 
variables first to test input-led output changes only. The results are reported in 
column 1 of table 6. After three policy variables are introduced, the fitness of 
regression 𝑅𝑅2 increases from 0.52 to 0.86. It thus conforms that policy changes 
increased the significance of physical inputs (table 6 columns 2 and 4).25  
 
 
23 𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 has a unit root at level in the model with a constant, but is still stationary at level with a 99 per cent 
confidence interval for the other two models. We consider this variable stationary at level.  
24 Here we use Akaike information criterion (AIC).  
25 Intuitively, resource inputs such as fertilizer were insignificant for the long-run agricultural output. 
However, Fan Shenggen found that fertilizer was only an important input at early stages of China’s reforms 
before 1985; see Fan, “Technological Change”. Our testing result conforms this, i.e. when observations 
are extended to a longer period, the significance of fertilizer was critically reduced in grain production.  
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However, one of the health diagnostic checks on residual shows 
heteroskedasticity.26 Weighted Least Squares (WLS) is used to address this problem 
(columns 4 and 5). The results are significant at the five per cent level or higher, 
derived either from the procurement price index (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡) or from the procurement fund 
(𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡). Furthermore, we test the joint-causality of all three policy variables together. 
The results are significant at a 99 per cent level (columns 3 and 5).  
With one to two years’ lag length, most significant physical inputs are negative 
(Column 2). This is especially true for land input, taking values of –1.750 and –
2.149 for one and two lag length, respectively. Labour and machinery inputs only 
significant with one lag length, implying these two variables have little impact on in 
the subsequent production cycle. In reality, China’s agricultural technology is geared 
towards land-saving.   
In addition, the VAR test reveals a long-term equilibrium between China’s 
national grain output on the one hand and the government procurement price/fund in 
the preceding year on the other. Coefficient of procurement fund is positive, taking 
values of 0.804 and 1.241 for one and two year lag length, respectively. An increase 
in procurement fund causes an immediate increase in food output with almost an 
equal magnitude. Different from procurement fund, government procurement price 
shows us a negative sign. In reality, when procurement price increases, the 
government needs a larger budget to purchase the same amount of food for the urban 
sector. The higher price government provides, the more it spends on procurement, 
hence influence the procurement budget in the follow year. The negative sign of 
procurement price to food production implies the instability of procurement pricing 
 
 
26 Our model passed ARCH heteroskedasticity check but not Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey test. To make sure the 
power of regression, we use the WLS to further correct the heteroskedasticity.  
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policies of the government (e.g., the post-1985 slowdown). Although the variable for 
urban food subsidies (𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡) is not individually significant in either the Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) or the WLS tests, 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 , 𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡  and 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡  jointly influence the grain 
output in the future one to two years with an above-95 per cent level of significance.  
 
Table 6. Unrestricted VAR of grain output on inputs and policy variables, 
1979–2006 
 OLS WLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Physical Input Variables        
Grain output (–1) (𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1) –0.287  –1.215 ***   –1.215 ***   
 (0.285)  (0.317)    (0.186)   
Grain output (–2) (𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−2) 0.124  –0.700    –0.700 **   
 (0.287)  (0.383)    (0.225)   
Labour (–1) (𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−1) 1.251  1.810 **   1.810 ***   
 (0.881)  (0.761)    (0.448)   
Labour (–2) (𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡−2) –0.254  –1.198    –1.198 **   
 (0.772)  (0.774)    (0.455)   
Land (–1) (𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡−1) –1.041  –1.750 **   –1.750 ***   
 (0.890)  (0.719)    (0.423)   
Land (–2) (𝐾𝐾𝑡𝑡−2) –2.611 ** –2.149 **   –2.149 ***   
 (1.112)  (0.926)    (0.545)   
Fertiliser (–1) (𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡−1) 0.286  0.262    0.262    
 (0.352)  (0.304)    (0.179)   
Fertiliser (–2) (𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡−2) –0.051  0.181    0.181    
 (0.320)  (0.273)    (0.161)   
Machine(–1) (𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡−1) –0.721  –1.214 *   –1.214 ***   
 (0.621)  (0.623)    (0.367)   
Machine (–2) (𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡−2) –0.239  –0.329    –0.329    
 (0.505)  (0.524)    (0.308)   
Policy Variables       
Procurement price (–1) (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−1)  –0.695 ** 22.371 *** –0.695 *** 64.629 *** 
  (0.301)    (0.177)   
Procurement price (–2) (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−2)  –1.349 ***   –1.349 ***   
  (0.347)    (0.204)   
Urban subsidy (–1) (𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡−1)  0.007    0.007    
  (0.041)    (0.024)   
Urban subsidy (–2) (𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡−2)  –0.004    –0.004    
  (0.020)    (0.012)   
Government procurement fund (–1) (𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡−1)  0.804 **   0.804 ***   
  (0.275)    (0.162)   
Government procurement fund (–2) (𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡−2)  1.241 ***   1.241 ***   
  (0.317)    (0.186)   
         
Constant 9.949 ** 13.424 **   13.424 ***   
 (4.570)  (4.930)    (2.901)    
Observations 26  26    26    
R2 0.518  0.862    0.862    
Serial correlation a   0.893 [0.452]     
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Heteroscedasticity b   0.228 [0.638]     
Normality c   0.369 [0.832]      
Stability d   Stable        
* = Significant at the 10 percent level.  
** = Significant at the 5 percent level. 
*** = Significant at the 1 percent level. 
Notes. a Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation LM test; b Auto-regressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) 
test; c Jacque-Bera normality test; d Cumulative sum of recursive residuals (CUSUM) test. Standard errors 
are reported in parentheses, while p-values are reported in square brackets. 
 
 
Our impulse-responses’ results demonstrate the findings in VAR regression from the 
view of each individual variable (figure 3). An increase in procurement fund causes an 
increase in food output in the follow year (response extent at 9.876, see lower right panel 
in Figure 3). The influence fades in five years (response extent at 1.119 in the fifth year, 
see lower left panel in Figure 3). By contrast, an increase in government’s real 
procurement price does not necessarily cause food output increase in the subsequent years. 
Instead, when food expenditure approximates its peak and is forced to reduce, it shows 
effect of reducing food output by the minimum (taking value of –6.992) in the following 
year and quickly bouncing back to a positive maximum in the fourth year (taking value of 
9.389) when procurement price policy stabilises. This conforms to the results of VAR 
tests. The unilateral changes in government grain procurement price and grain purchase 
fund caused long-run volatile fluctuations in food production. But response to changes in 
food subsidies was weak. Empirically, this result is reasonable since urban food 
subsidy was most effective from 1979 to 1993. In contrast to the regression result, food 
production returned quickly to equilibrium from shocks to non-policy variables, which 
indicates that China’s agricultural technology was advanced enough to cope with shocks 
to physical inputs for food production. Compared with physical inputs, food production in 
China was more sensitive to policy changes.  
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Figure 3. Impulse responses in the production-inputs-policy VAR 
Note: The shock corresponds to one standard deviation of the residual in each 
variable. 
 
In all, our empirical results are reasonable since all three new variables played a major 
part in government fiscal expenditure for grain procurement between 1979 and 2006. The 
largest component of urban subsidy – the grain coupons – was in place from 1979 to 1993. 
The Wald joint causality test and impulse-response empirical results also confirm food 
policy intensity in Table 4.  
The food policy framework empirically tested above is further supported by 
evidence shown in Figure 4 where the policy trajectory shows (i) the 1979–88 
procurement price data, (ii) the 1989–93 food subsidy data, (iii) the 1994–2003 rice 
budget data, and (iv) the 2004–06 price index data.27 Considering the lag in the 
agricultural production cycle, we move the policy trajectory to the right. Changes in 
 
 
27 Data for government grain bureau deficits are available only for 1997 to 2003.  
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food production mirror the trend of food policy changes. This conforms to our 
findings of policy review in Section 2.  
 
 
 
Figure 4. Changes in policies and food security, 1979–2006  
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook, Finance Yearbook of China, China Price 
Statistical Yearbook and China Agriculture Yearbook.  
Notes: This figure plots the key changes in China’s food policies and food 
production from 1979 to 2006. The upper curve plots the changes in rice 
production in China. The lower curves present policies changes which are 
estimated by procurement price, urban subsidy load, grain procurement fund, 
and grain market price sequentially. The procurement price indices used in this 
figure excludes the weight of the current year’s CPI.  
 
What can be argued from the above empirical results is that output fluctuations in 
China’s food production were a result of the government food policy swings that 
were ultimately determined by the “visible hand” of the reformist state that aimed to 
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guide the economy towards a simulated, price based market signal system. 
Eventually, the state trained the peasantry to read the price signals and at the same 
time weaned the urban consumers from generous food subsidies to allow them to 
face the market (see Figure 9). In the end the “visible hand” withdrew, as intended.  
 
Figure 9. Food price conversion in rebuilding food security 
Source: Same as figure 2. 
Notes: This figure plots the conversion between the grain procurement price and 
urban food retail price. Food prices diverged until 1990 and after 1998 it 
converged to the same trend. This figure also indicates the process that how 
China’s Gerschenkron state manipulated price signals for both rural and urban 
sector to meet the price gap between production and consumption.  
 
 
6. Conclusion 
By establishing the causality from government fiscal capacity in Beijing to grain 
production in villages, this article reveals the mechanisms in which a reformist state 
acted as a proxy for the market by creating and sending the peasantry artificial price 
signals under a state monopsony on behalf of the demand side to generate food 
output from the supply side composed of more or less autonomous producers for a 
market.  
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In particular, China’s Gerschenkronian policies aimed to re-establish the market 
economy for food after 1979. But there was no market economy yet. The 
Gerschenkronian prices (either government procurement prices for the rural sector or 
government subsidised prices for the urban sector) served as a learning process for 
the economy to get used to resource allocation in a non-planned economy; a step 
towards revival of the market that was eliminated by the state after 1949. The 
challenge to the reformist state was how to get food prices right so that enough food 
was produced by the peasantry during the first stage of the post-Mao reforms when a 
functional market was long absent due to the Soviet system adopted by Maoist 
China.  
The Gerschenkronian price signals were received positively by the rural 
producers. High procurement prices encouraged food supply in the next food 
production cycle and hence improved China’s food security. But a low food price 
suited the urban sector that lived on government subsidies. The result was dual 
prices for the same food. The price gap had to be bridged by government fiscal 
capacity.  
This nurturing and tutoring of the market by the state was largely a process of 
trial and error which in turn determined inevitable frequent changes to get the food 
prices “right” (meaning that the food market clears itself). Operationally, the state 
food monopsony caused policy swings, sometimes on a massive scale. Meanwhile, 
the new price-responsive food outputs fluctuated accordingly, which sometimes 
threatened China’s food security in the short run.  
Even so, the purpose was clear: to strike a balance between government grain 
procurement for the rural producers and affordable food for urban residents. In the 
end, the Gerschenkron state did succeed in getting the prices right; China’s 
agriculture was successfully marketised. This is shown in figure 9: After 1998, the 
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government procurement price for rice was the same as the market price; and the 
urban food retail price was practically identical with the market price for rice as well. 
The “reform mission” was accomplished. 
 
Our findings also show that for China’s food production physical inputs were 
necessary but not the only sufficient factors. Institutions and policies played a 
significant role. This point differs from the traditional view on China’s post-reform 
agricultural performance. State intervention and monopsony helped government 
achieve reform goals, but the Gerschenkron state had to struggle with its fiscal limits. 
Even so, in the end, the state did get the price right for food on behalf of the market, 
an important deed that we should not underestimate or take for granted.  
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